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WHAT MAKES MEMORIES EPISODIC?
John Zeimbekis
Episodic memories are generally thought to be memories of token perceptions. This leads some
philosophers to claim that they provide non-inferential warrant for beliefs about the past, just like
perception  provides  warrant  for  beliefs  about  the  present.  I  examine  the  scope  of  that
epistemological  claim.  I  argue that  in  everyday empirical reasoning about the very recent  past,
episodic memories  reliably justify beliefs  in  a non-inferential  way because in those cases  their
contents are implicitly restricted to contexts. Beyond such contexts, in long-term recall, episodic
memories may or may not warrant beliefs about the past non-inferentially. They provide a form of
entitlement only if a substantial empirical assumption turns out to be true, namely: that long-term
recall reliably preserves perceptual content from single perceptual episodes (that is, an act of recall
cannot draw on several past perceptual episodes). What if that assumption turns out to be false? I
make a proposal about what kinds of states long-term recollections would be in that case. A long-
term recollection would be a thought whose reference is specified semantically,  but which also
consists of perceptual imagery, potentially drawn from many past perceptions. The upshot would be
that long-term recollection, which is considered a key feature of episodic memory, exploits both the
semantic and the episodic memory systems. 
